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Full Faith and Credit, Choice of Laws, and
Extraterritorial Regulation of Corporate
Transactions
By GREGORY S. SERGIENKO* and MAUREEN B. CALLAHAN**
Introduction
In a federal system in which each state may enact laws providing for
the chartering and governance of corporations and in which corporations
can and do conduct business in more than one state, several states may
claim an interest in regulating the conduct of a given corporation. The
enactment of state laws that are intended to restrict hostile corporate
takeovers and that purport to extend to foreign corporations' is one ex-
ample of this phenomenon.2 "Typically, any of a number of jurisdic-
tional links might trigger the application of such an anti-takeover statute:
the target's being incorporated in the state, its having a principal office or
major operations in the state, or the existence of a significant number of
target shareholders in the state."3 The Supreme Court of Delaware, the
state where most large companies incorporate, has held that it may vio-
* Member, Washington State Bar Assoc.; J.D., Harvard University, 1985; A.B.,
Harvard University, 1980. The authors would like to thank Thomas C. Mitchell for his review
of a draft of this Article.
** Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law; J.D., University of
Chicago, 1985; A.B., University of California at Santa Cruz, 1977.
1. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23B.19.010-.050 (1989).
2. Extraterritorial legislation regarding corporate activity is not limited to the regulation
of takeovers. See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr.
719 (1961) (applying California law to Delaware corporation to prevent corporation from
eliminating cumulative voting); Newmark v. C & C Super Corp., 4 Misc. 2d 693, 159 N.Y.S.2d
77 (applying New York's inspection law to a Delaware corporation), modified on other
grounds, 3 A.D.2d 823, 160 N.Y.S.2d 936, aff'd mem., 3 N.Y.2d 790, 143 N.E.2d 796, 164
N.Y.S.2d 42 (1957); Gresov v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 29 Misc. 2d 324, 215 N.Y.S.2d
98 (1961) (applying New York's inspection law to a Delaware corporation and staying a share-
holder's meeting in Arizona pending the inspection); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103 (West Supp.
1991) (exempting certain transactions from review by the California Commissioner of Corpo-
rations unless 25% of the shareholders of the corporation have California addresses); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1306, 1315-1320 (McKinney 1986) (imposing disclosure requirements on
foreign corporations and setting forth liability rules governing them).
3. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 569 (1986).
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late the Commerce Clause4 for a state to regulate a corporation organ-
ized under the laws of another state.5 Other states' extraterritorial efforts
to limit the rights of shareholders of Delaware corporations potentially
conflict with Delaware law, which allows shareholders, even those who
acquire the stock of a company as a result of a hostile takeover, complete
control over the acquired corporation.6
The stage is thus set for a conflict. A principled resolution of this
conflict is essential so that the parties to corporate transactions can pre-
dict which laws govern their behavior. How is this conflict to be
resolved?
The most appropriate federal constitutional provision for resolving
such conflicts is the Full Faith and Credit Clause.7 The United States
Supreme Court has recently revived the use of the Clause to require
states to apply other states' legislation and common law.8 Past scholar-
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987). The court held that applying
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(c) (1983), which limits the voting power of capital stock under
some circumstances, to a foreign corporation would subject the corporation to the laws of
Delaware in violation of the Commerce Clause. 531 A.2d at 217-19. In McDermott, the Dela-
ware court applied Panamanian law to permit a subsidiary to vote shares of its parent's stock.
Id. at 209. In contrast, Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 263-64 (2d Cir.
1984), applied New York law, rather than Panamanian law, to prohibit a subsidiary from
voting stock in its parent because Panama had no "legitimate and substantial interest" in the
transaction.
6. The conflicting assertions of jurisdiction are accompanied by conflicting substantive
law. Extraterritorial efforts by other states to limit hostile takeovers by restricting the rights of
shareholders of Delaware corporations to control the assets of those corporations potentially
conflict with Delaware law, which allows shareholders more control over the acquired corpo-
ration. In addition to the exceptions most states provide for acquisitions made with the prior
approval of the board, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (1983), Delaware law also does
not restrict the rights of those shareholders who hold 85 percent or more of the stock of the
corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (1983). Thus, Delaware law inhibits
coercive tender offers by limiting abuse of minority shareholders, but allows those who acquire
at least 85 percent of the stock unrestricted control.
7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof." Id.
8. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). In earlier years,
the Supreme Court enforced the Full Faith and Credit Clause in cases not involving recogni-
tion of judgments. See generally Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Deci-
sions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARv. L. REv. 533, 562 (1926).
The Due Process Clause also imposes limits on the states' abilities to make arbitrary
choices of law because the application of unexpected rules of law may unfairly disappoint the
parties' reasonable expectations about what law would govern. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281
U.S. 397 (1930). The Supreme Court, over the objections of Justice Stevens, has overruled past
cases, eg., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154 (1932), that held that the
ship says little about the implications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
in such Cases.9 Most discussions of the constitutionality of state regula-
tion of hostile takeovers focus on the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses
and do not consider the Full Faith and Credit Clause.10
Full Faith and Credit Clause provides more protection than the Due Process Clause. Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 n.10 (citing cases); id. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting) (ac-
cepting plurality's analysis). Cf id. at 321-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (recog-
nizing that "both this Court's analysis of choice-of-law questions and scholarly criticism of
these decisions have treated these two inquiries [under the Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit Clauses] as though they were indistinguishable" (citations omitted)).
The Court's assumption that the Due Process Clause is coextensive with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause may be questioned. Due process rights are waivable. See D.H. Overmyer
Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972). If the Due Process Clause were the sole source of
rights to governing law, one would expect that contractual provisions specifying a choice of
law would be binding. Courts do not follow this analysis. For example, in a loan contract
usurious in the borrower's domicile but lawful in the lender's domicile, courts frequently re-
fused to honor a choice of the law of the lender's domicile. See National Mut. Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Brahan, 193 U.S. 635, 647 (1904) (permitting, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
the application of the usury law of the borrower to a contract stipulated to be governed by
another law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 (1971); id comment e,
illustration 8 (a contractual provision choosing the law of the state of incorporation of a lender
does not validate an otherwise usurious contract); Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses
in Contract Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1659 (1982); Comment, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris,
55 CALIF. L. REv. 123 (1967). Indeed, in other areas the Court upheld the use of a law other
than the one chosen by the parties. In Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903), the Court
upheld a state law prohibiting the parties from agreeing to a divorce outside their marital
domicile. In Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 504-05
(1939), the Court allowed California to apply its worker's compensation law despite the par-
ties' agreement to apply Massachusetts law. The Court approved this decision in Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422-24 (1979). Cf Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945):
But those not parties to a litigation ought not to be foreclosed by the interested ac-
tions of others; especially not a State which is concerned with the vindication of its
own social policy and has no means, certainly no effective means, to protect that
interest against the selfish action of those outside its borders.
These results seem inexplicable under the Due Process Clause but obvious under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause because of the interest of one state in protecting or regulating its own citi-
zens.
Whatever the ultimate result of this dispute, the analysis of conflicts between different
states' corporate laws suggested in this Article will not be affected. The planning functions
implicated by conflicting regulations fit into core due process concerns, so the problems ad-
dressed by this Article do not depend on an extension of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
beyond the scope of the Due Process Clause.
9. The only recent discussion is Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the
Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 29 (1987), which notes the
difficulty raised in this Article, but does not suggest any particular solution.
10. See, e.g., Callahan & Burman, The Validity of Washington's Antitakeover Act Under
the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 41 (1989); Fischel, From
MITE to CTS: State Anti-takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause, and In-
sider Trading, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 47; Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Take-
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Even Supreme Court precedent does not provide a workable solu-
tion to the conflict. The Court has recognized that the full faith and
credit requirements extend to state substantive law." Despite this recog-
nition, the Court's assumption that the power to establish this law-ju-
risdiction to prescribe' 2 -is based on the presence within the state of the
things the state seeks to regulate, renders the Court's analyses in the area
of conflict of laws inapposite. This leaves the court with no basis for
deciding which state's laws govern: (1) the state of incorporation, which
has the power over the existence of the corporate entity, or (2) the state
where the physical assets and employees of the corporation are located,
which would ordinarily control the corporation's relationships with these
assets and employees. 3 Moreover, the Court's rejection of past prece-
dents holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause provided stronger
protection than the Due Process Clause may indicate that the Court is
unwilling to resolve these conflicts.' 4
In this Article, we first address the shortcomings of the traditional
power analysis. We then propose an alternative means of establishing
constitutional standards for legislative assertions of jurisdiction over
transactions involving substantial amounts of planning-the universality
requirement.
Our proposal incorporates a presumption in favor of the internal
over Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 203 (1987) (examining whether anti-takeover legislation is
prohibited by the Commerce Clause or preempted by the Williams Act).
11. "[FIor a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible man-
ner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." All-
state Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion), quoted in Phillips
Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 818.
12. "Jurisdiction to prescribe" is the state's power "to make its law applicable to the
activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a) (1987). While the
Restatement deals with foreign relations law, the definition of jurisdiction to prescribe applies
whenever multiple jurisdictions seek to prescribe the rules governing a transaction or
occurrence.
13. E.g., Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903) (allowing internally inconsistent asser-
tion of jurisdiction to tax), overruled by Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204,
209 (1930); Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730, 732 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (double taxation of in-
tangibles by two different states was permissible because no state's theory could be shown to be
repugnant to the Federal Constitution).
14. Compare Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 818 (plurality opinion) (applying the same
test to determine compliance with both the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses)
with Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154 (1932) (Brandeis, J.) (finding a
violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but not of the Due Process Clause) and Phillips
Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 824 (Stevens, J., concurring) (favoring differing analyses for full faith
and credit and due process inquiries).
affairs doctrine,"5 so that states may not regulate relations among or be-
tween foreign corporations and their shareholders, officers, directors, and
assets. This presumption could be overcome if the state attempting to
assert jurisdiction over foreign corporations recognizes other states' as-
sertions of jurisdiction over its own corporations on similar facts. For
example, State A could assert jurisdiction to regulate a foreign corpora-
tion based on the presence of a majority of the corporation's assets within
State A so long as it recognized State B's power to regulate corporations
incorporated in State A with most of their assets in State B.
Conversely, a state could not claim jurisdiction on the basis of both
(1) the state of incorporation and (2) the presence within the state of
more than fifty percent of the assets. To do so could lead to two states
having the same legislation and asserting jurisdiction over the same cor-
poration, because a corporation could be incorporated under one state's
laws, but have most of its assets in another.
Under most circumstances, when one state's assertion of jurisdiction
is not intended to preclude the laws of another state, the law is valid. For
example, a state could require reporting of corporations on the basis of
presence of property, presence of shareholders, and state of incorpora-
tion. A corporation could satisfy simultaneously the requirements of two
such states. Because both states' obligations could be satisfied without
interfering with the principles of either state, such schemesdo not, under
our proposal, violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
This test supplements and does not displace the conventional full
faith and credit analysis. A state has "no interest in protecting nonresi-
dent shareholders of nonresident corporations."16 The absence of any
interest means that its claim to regulate on the basis of protecting nonres-
ident shareholders must fail, even without regard to competing interests.
15. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that
only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-
matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its cur-
rent officers, directors, and shareholders---because otherwise a corporation could be
faced with conflicting demands.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 302 comment b (1971)).
16. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
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I. The Traditional Approach: Jurisdiction To Prescribe Based
on Power
A. The Development of the Power Analysis in Supreme Court Case Law
Initially, courts analyzed jurisdiction to adjudicate17 in the same
way that they analyzed jurisdiction to prescribe: what state had power to
control the situation? Control over people or things at the time of the
suit provided jurisdiction to adjudicate. 8 Likewise, control over people
or things at the time of the activities giving rise to the obligation sought
to be enforced provided jurisdiction to prescribe.
Courts based jurisdiction to prescribe on two things: on the pres-
ence of persons or things and on the permanent residence or domicile of
the parties sought to be affected.19 As to the first, Justice Story wrote in
his treatise on conflict of laws, "The first and most general maxim or
proposition is that, which has been already adverted to, that every nation
possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own terri-
tory."20 Cases like Pennoyer v. Neff, which held that "every State pos-
sesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory,"'" were based on Story's theories. Similarly, the
Court upheld power to impose a transfer tax based on the debtor's domi-
cile: "Power over the person of the debtor confers jurisdiction, we re-
peat."22 This power could be exercised even over a transitory defendant
for the purposes of a transaction with no connection with the forum
other than the transitory presence of the defendant.23
In addition, jurisdiction to prescribe could be based on residence or
domicile. This resulted from the adaptation of the rule that a king had
sovereignty over his subjects.
17. The term "jurisdiction to adjudicate" is taken from von Mehren & Trautman, Juris-
diction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
18. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977). See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 17. Traditionally, jurisdiction
based on the domicile or presence of persons was known as jurisdiction in personam while
jurisdiction based on the presence of the property within the territory of the forum was known
as jurisdiction in rem. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 & n.12 (1958).
19. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 196-206 (1977).
20. J. STORY, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLicr OF LAWS § 18, at 26 (5th ed. 1857).
21. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). Pennoyer also adopted the rules governing power to adjudi-
cate among nations as the appropriate test for allocating power to adjudicate among the states
of the United States. Id.
22. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189, 206 (1903), overruled by Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
23. See New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1959) (upholding Florida's power to order a
witness to testify in New York based on his presence within Florida).
CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS
Every nation has hitherto assumed it as clear, that it possesses the
right to regulate and govern its own native born subjects every-
where; and consequently, that its laws extend to, and bind such
subjects at all times, and in all places. This is commonly adduced
as a consequence of what is called natural allegiance, that is, of
allegiance to the government of the territory of a man's birth.24
While Story's treatise also stated, "Another maxim, or proposition, is,
that no State or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or bind property
out of its own territory, or bind persons not resident therein, whether
they are natural born subjects or others,"25 indirect regulation was cer-
tainly allowed. The Supreme Court applied this rule in such areas as
criminal law,26 ordinary civil law,27 taxation,23 and divorce.29
The exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe based on power over the
territory in which the critical acts took place was expressed in rules such
as lex loci contractus.30 This rule led to the development of the vested
rights theory, under which rights acquired at the situs of the contract
continued wherever the parties went.31 Similarly, under longstanding
conflict of laws principles, the place of the wrong governed liability in
tort.3 2 This was so even though the place was related only by chance to
24. J. STORY, supra note 20, § 21, at 29.
25. Id § 20, at 28 (emphasis added).
26. See, eg., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77-79 (1941) (state criminal sanctions may
be imposed on the state's citizens for acts committed on the high seas).
27. See, eg., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940) (upholding extraterritorial
service of process based on domicile).
28. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 315 (1937) (upholding state
tax on domiciliary's income earned from property located out of the state).
29. See, eg., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942) (state can alter the
marital status of its domiciliaries even if the other spouse is absent).
30. "Lex loci contractus" means "the law of the place where the contract was made." 2
J.H. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1044 (1935). Generally, the rule meant that "contracts
... are.., expounded and executed ... according to the laws of the place in which they were
made." Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839) (Taney, CJ.).
31. H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 8-10 (1927). Under this
view, "rights once vested under the law continue until they are destroyed or cut off by law."
Id. at 10. Such rights are "recognized and enforced in one state though they have come into
being in another, unless such enforcement is, for good reason, thought contrary to the public
policy of the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought." Id. See also Beale, What Law Governs
the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARV. L. REV. 260, 270-72 (1910); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW 173 (3d ed. 1977).
32. For example, in Western Union Tele. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914), a telegram
was to be sent from South Carolina to the District of Columbia. A delay in its delivery caused
mental anguish. Damages for anguish were recoverable in South Carolina, but not in the
District of Columbia. Suit was brought in South Carolina. Justice Holmes, writing for the
Court, held that the state could not allow recovery. "[W]hen a state attempts.., to affect
Winter 1991]
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the interests involved.33 A state had the power to adjudicate a claim over
land within its borders even without jurisdiction over the person.34 In-
deed, this power was so well established that the Supreme Court denied
recognition of a judgment procured away from the situs of the land.
3 1
Reliance on domicile as a basis for imposing duties also illustrates
this power-based approach. In Cole v. Cunningham,3 6 a state was al-
lowed to enjoin a domiciliary from pursuing actions outside the state.
Similarly, the state of a person's domicile could tax her on chattels
owned elsewhere.37 In some instances, this power to tax was to the ex-
clusion of attempts to tax elsewhere.3 As with jurisdiction based on the
conduct outside its jurisdiction or the consequences of such conduct, and to infringe upon the
power of the United States [within the District of Columbia], it must fail." Id. at 547.
Any special status of the United States was probably not critical in reaching such a result.
Earlier, the Court spoke in territorial terms in defining "the natural limits of [jurisdictional]
power" and referred to land outside the territory as "within the jurisdiction of a distinct
power." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 442 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.). In Cohens,
Virginia sought to prosecute for the sale in Virginia of lottery tickets issued by the District of
Columbia, in the face of a federal statute authorizing the city to raise money through a lottery.
Id. The Court interpreted the statute as not prohibiting states from penalizing the sale of
lottery tickets. Id. at 447; see also REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNFLIcT op LAWS §§ 146-
47 (1971). In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), the plaintiff had recovered a judgment
against the State of Nevada in the California courts based on the conduct of a Nevada em-
ployee inside California. The Court held that this judgment was entitled to full faith and
credit, although Nevada law would have limited recovery to $25,000.
33. An example of this principle in an area that remains controlled by federal principles of
conflict of laws is admiralty. Until quite recently, the Supreme Court has consistently followed
Justice Story's opinion as a Circuit Justice that "[t]he admiralty jurisdiction in tort was tradi-
tionally 'bounded by locality,' encompassing all torts that took place on navigable waters."
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 215 n.7 (1969) (citations omitted) (quoting
De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776) (Story, J.)). As the Court
noted, Justice Story's opinion as Circuit Judge had been followed in Insurance Co. v. Dunham,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1871). The Supreme Court has rejected a locality test as a sole predicate
for determining what torts are within the admiralty jurisdiction. The Court held that the
landing of a plane in navigable water did not make the resulting lawsuits subject to admiralty
jurisdiction, regardless of whether the accident was caused by negligence over the water or on
the ground. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972); see also
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
34. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877), overruled by Shafer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977); Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812
(Holmes, C.J.), appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900) (giving Massachusetts jurisdiction to
clear title based on the presence of land in the state).
35. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1909).
36. 133 U.S. 107, 114 (1890).
37. Savings & Loan Soc'y v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421, 427 (1898).
38. Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855). More recently, the
Supreme Court has written:
The "home port doctrine" enunciated in Hays was a corollary of the medieval maxim
mobilia sequunturpersonam ("movables follow the person") and resulted in personal
property being taxable in full at the domicile of the owner. This theory of taxation,
of course, has fallen into desuetude, and the "home port doctrine," as a rule for
presence of land, jurisdiction based on domicile could be so compelling
that it allowed states to deny recognition of judgments not based on dom-
icile. Haddock v. Haddock 3 9 held that the state of the marital domicile
could preserve a marriage although another state had granted a divorce
to one spouse without acquiring jurisdiction over the other spouse resid-
ing in the state of the marital domicile. Andrews v. Andrews' held that a
state had no power to grant a divorce even though both spouses were
present in the court.41
Of course, these two theories were not consistent. While Justice
Story wrote that no State could "directly affect" persons and property
outside the state, his text implicitly recognized that indirect effects were
the necessary result of jurisdiction to prescribe exercised against absent
domiciliaries.Y Corporations were no freer than natural persons from
the consequences of this conflict.
B. Applying the Power Analysis to Corporate Affairs
The Court's power analysis creates a conflict between competing
powers. Claims of jurisdiction to prescribe may be based on both domi-
cile and contract on the one hand (i.e., the internal affairs doctrine) and,
on the other hand, the presence of people and things to which the corpo-
ration has ties-the corporation's external relations. This dichotomy
makes resolution of the potential conflicts resulting from the attempted
extraterritorial regulation of hostile takeovers under the traditional
power analysis impossible. First, we briefly discuss the law establishing
jurisdiction to prescribe as to corporations founded on these two bases of
jurisdiction. Second, we address the inadequacies of the power analysis
as applied to attempts to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe corporate
conduct.
taxation of moving equipment, has yielded to a rule of fair apportionment among the
States. This Court, accordingly, has held that various instrumentalities of commerce
may be taxed, on a properly apportioned basis, by the nondomiciliary States through
which they travel.
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 442 (1979) (citations omitted); see
also infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
39. 201 U.S. 562 (1906), overruled by Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
40. 188 U.S. 14 (1903).
41. A Massachusetts statute relevant in Andrews prohibited inhabitants from getting a
divorce elsewhere based on conduct that occurred in Massachusetts, or based on conduct that
would not have authorized a divorce under Massachusetts laws. Id. at 29.
42. J. STORY, supra note 20.
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1. The Internal Affairs Doctrine
The traditional theory of jurisdiction over intra-corporate relations
allows only the state of incorporation to regulate the internal affairs of
the corporation. Two factors explain the internal affairs doctrine. First,
a corporation is created by the state.
[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries
of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contem-
plation of law, and by force of the law; and where that law ceases
to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the co[r]poration can have
no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot
migrate to another sovereignty.43
Because the state of incorporation gives the corporation its existence, it is
subject to the power of that state.' Thus, under this power theory, the
state of incorporation has the sole power to regulate its corporations. 45
This reasoning was repeated recently in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America .46
Second, a corporation is a contract.47 Because the law of the place
of contracting governs, other states could not apply laws that interfered
with the contract. 48 This comity-based conclusion is reinforced by the
Contract Clause.49  Because other states could not alter a contract's
terms, they could not interfere with a corporation's internal affairs.5"
These principles led the courts to require the application of the laws
of the state of organization. Some of the most remarkable cases involved
benevolent organizations. These fraternal societies served as mutual in-
surance companies. As insurance companies, their contracts normally
would have been easily within the scope of regulation of the state in
which the insured was domiciled. 51 However, because these were mutual
43. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
44. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819),
quoted in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
45. Cf Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 167 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.)
("To this source of its being, then, we must recur to ascertain its powers .... ").
46. 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) ("It thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in this
country for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights
that are acquired by purchasing their shares.").
47. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 643-44.
48. See Order of Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Harrison v.
Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289, 298-99 (1809).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, el. 1.
50. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 643-44.
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 192 (1971). However, the
Restatement suggests that group insurance policies could be "governed by [the] law which
governs the master policy. This is because it is desirable that each individual insured should
enjoy the same privileges and protection." Id. at comment h. "
societies, which incorporated their contracts with members into by-laws,
they were relatively immune from state regulation.
The Supreme Court has held comparatively recently that the forum
state could not use its own statute of limitations to allow a suit barred by
the limitations period established in the articles of incorporation of a fra-
ternal benefit organization.52 The case is a remarkably strong instance of
the displacement of forum law because, as the case recognized, statutes of
limitation are ordinarily considered procedural, and so can be governed
by forum law even though the forum has no connection with the claim
sued upon.
5 3
In an earlier case, the Court was faced with a by-law, adopted after
the member in question joined, which provided that death benefits could
not be paid until the life expectancy of the supposed decedent expired. 4
Under the law of the forum, long absence implied death. The by-law to
the contrary was held to govern. Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous
Court:
The indivisible unity between the members of a corporation of this
kind in respect of the fund from which their rights are to be en-
forced and the consequence that their rights must be determined
by a single law, is elaborated in Supreme Council of the Royal Ar-
canum v. Green.5 5 The act of becoming a member is something
more than a contract, it is entering into a complex and abiding
relation, and as marriage looks to domicil, membership looks to
and must be governed by the law of the State granting the
incorporation. 5
In Royal Arcanum, the Court emphasized the need to use Massachusetts
law, notwithstanding the New York residence of the shareholder, be-
cause the Massachusetts charter of the corporation meant that the parties
consented to Massachusetts law and because of the need to avoid confus-
ing and inconsistent standards of liability.57
The authority of the state of incorporation extended even to matters
52. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586.
53. Id. at 607. See also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724-27 (1988) (no consti-
tutional objection to a state's applying its own statute of limitations to a suit with no other
connection to the forum). In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964), the Court
allowed a state other than the one in which the contract was written to override a provision
requiring suit to be brought within one year. The Court described Wolfe as "a highly special-
ized decision dealing with unique facts," and referred to the indivisible unity involved in frater-
nal benefit corporations. Id.
54. Modem Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925) (Holmes, J.).
55. 237 U.S. 531, 542 (1915).
56. 267 U.S. at 551 (citation moved to footnote).
57. 237 U.S. at 542-43.
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of other states' procedure. In Broderick v. Rosner,5 8 Justice Brandeis,
writing for the Court, dealt with a New York law making shareholders of
banking corporations liable for the par value of their shares in addition to
the amount invested.59 Broderick, the New York Superintendent of
Banks, sued shareholders domiciled in New Jersey in New Jersey state
court. New Jersey law barred such an action unless all shareholders and
creditors were involved.' As a practical matter, this meant that no ac-
tion could be brought against the New Jersey domiciliaries because one
could not obtain jurisdiction in a New Jersey action over those who were
neither resident nor doing business in New Jersey.61 Even if one could
bring an action, the requirement of joinder would make the cost of the
action prohibitively expensive.62
The Court held that New Jersey could not apply this regulation in
its own courts.63
The statutory liability sought to be enforced is contractual in char-
acter. The assessment is an incident of the incorporation. Thus
the subject matter is peculiarly within the regulatory power of New
York, as the State of incorporation. "So much so," as was said in
Converse v. Hamilton," "that no other State properly can be said
to have any public policy thereon.",
65
The Court relied on cases involving fraternal benefit corporations, and on
past cases equating them with ordinary corporations.
66
These cases demonstrate that the internal affairs doctrine goes be-
yond the ordinary rule that prohibited courts from applying one state's
law to contracts formed in another state. For example, under New York
Life Insurance Co. v. Head,67 a state that was merely the place the con-
tract was made could not prohibit the parties from altering that contract
outside the state. In Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,6" Justice
Brandeis, writing for the Court, suggested that New Hampshire could
58. 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
59. Id. at 637.
60. Id. at 638.
61. Id. at 639.
62. Id. at 640.
63. This result is like that in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), except that the foreign
law that a state must enforce is that of another state, not the federal government, so that the
textual basis for the enforcement is the Full Faith and Credit Clause, not the Supremacy
Clause.
64. 224 U.S. 243, 260 (1912) (italics added).
65. 294 U.S. at 643 (citation moved to footnote).
66. Id. at 643-44 (quoting Modem Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925)
(Holmes, J.), suggesting no substantial difference between the benevolent corporation and reg-
ular corporation cases).
67. 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
68. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
modify Vermont worker's compensation law as applied to conduct oc-
curring in New Hampshire. "It [the statute] does not attempt to forbid
or regulate subsequent modification of the Vermont contract . .
The Court's interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause70 to exclude corporations from its protection might have allowed
the states greater power to regulate corporations. 71 However, the states'
power to exclude corporations entirely did not allow the states to condi-
tion the admission of corporations on their accepting conditions "incon-
sistent with those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and
authority of each State from encroachment by all others."7 2 Subsequent
cases expressly held that a state could not condition the admission of
foreign corporations on the application of the state's laws to a transaction
more properly within the sphere of other states.7 3 Consequently, no
countervailing constitutional doctrine modified the impetus the Com-
merce and Contracts Clauses provided toward eliminating any claim by
states other than the state of incorporation to regulate the internal affairs
of a corporation.
2. The External Relations of the Corporation
The second legal theory underlying state laws asserting a right to
regulate corporate transactions is that jurisdiction to prescribe can be
based on the presence of the people or things with which the corporation
69. Id at 157 n.7.
70. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
71. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177-78 (1869). The Court stated that the
states "may exclude the foreign corporation entirely; they may restrict its business to particu-
lar localities, or they may exact such security for the performance of its contracts with their
citizens as in their judgment will best promote the public interest." Id. at 181; see also Anglo-
American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903) (a state could bar a suit
by a foreign corporation on a foreign judgment even though domestic corporations could sue
on foreign judgments).
72. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 456 (1874) (quoting Lafayette Ins.
Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1855) (citation omitted)). In Morse, an out-of-state
insurance company's right to do business in the state had been conditioned on an agreement
not to remove cases to federal court. The Supreme Court allowed removal, notwithstanding
the agreement. The Morse Court continued, "None of the cases so much as intimate that
conditions may be imposed which are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United
States, or inconsistent with those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and author-
ity of each State from encroachment by others." Id. at 457. The Court rejected the dissent's
appeal to the authority of Paul by describing the statements of that Court as dicta. Id. at 455-
56.
73. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1914); accord Louis K. Liggett
Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928). An additional limit on the states' power over
foreign corporations was that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited states from imposing an
unequal tax on foreign corporations qualified to do business. Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S.
400, 418 (1910).
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has ties-its external relations. Like the states' ability to adjudicate
claims concerning land within their borders, 4 these efforts result from a
territorial basis for jurisdiction to prescribe.
These were exceptions to the general rule that the applicable law is
that of the state of incorporation. In general, the laws of agency of the
state where third parties were dealing with the agent governed the princi-
pal's liability for its agents' conduct with those third parties, whether the
principal was a corporation or a natural person.75 Furthermore, a state
could give a foreign corporation good title to land located in the state,
although the law of the state of incorporation prohibited the corporation
from owning land.76 Transfers from the corporation that violated the
creditors' interests were likely to be assessed on the basis of the law
where the tangible assets existed.77 And, while some authorities sug-
gested that the obligations of majority shareholders, directors, and of-
ficers to the corporation and to minority shareholders were to be
determined generally by the law of the state of incorporation, 7 numer-
ous cases reached the opposite result. 9 The latter cases often represent
the common situation when a Delaware incorporation is chosen for con-
venience, but no other corporate contacts exist with Delaware.
The traditional modes of regulation based on the presence of the
corporation's external relations were so obvious that they seldom led to
discussion. For example, state courts routinely applied domestic law to
issues involving fraudulent conveyances, bulk transfers, secured transac-
tions, and disregard of the corporate form even though foreign corpora-
tions are involved. These issues do not affect the rights of the
corporation and shareholders inter se.80 Because such cases concerned
the rights of those not a party to the contract of incorporation, the rule
that contracts were to be governed by the law of the state of contracting,
which was one reason for deferring to the law of the state of incorpora-
tion, did not apply.
74. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
75. See R STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 292 comment d, illustration 2
(1971); id. § 301.
76. Id § 301 comment c, illustration 1.
77. See U.C.C. § 6-102 (1988).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 306, 309 (1971).
79. E.g., Schwarz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 110 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1940) (law of
state in which foreign corporation was doing business was applied); Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh,
639 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982) (refusal to apply law of the state of incorporation when corpo-
ration had more significant contacts with forum).
80. See generally Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law
and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1120-23 (1958).
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In the area of bulk sales, for example, the original version of the
Uniform Commercial Code, and Article 6, its recently proposed revision,
illustrate the alternatives. The original version made the bulk sales laws
applicable to goods within the state."1 The proposed amendments, as of
this writing, have been adopted by committee, but have not been ap-
proved by the American Law Institute. The amendments confer jurisdic-
tion on the basis of the corporation's principal place of business.8 2 The
case law interpreting the bulk sales act recognizes the need to protect
creditors, but not contracting parties. The cases conclude that failure to
satisfy the act may not invalidate the contract as between the contracting
parties, even though it may invalidate the transfer as to creditors.83
Secured transactions law, albeit not known by this term until re-
cently, has never been subject to the law of the state of incorporation.
An early opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall illustrates the distinc-
tion drawn between contract issues and issues of priority.
The law of the place where a contract is made is, generally
speaking, the law of the contract; it is the law by which the con-
tract is expounded. But the right of priority forms no part of the
contract itself. It is extrinsic, and is rather a personal privilege
dependent on the law of the place where the property lies, and
where the court sits which is to decide the cause.84
Similarly, the courts disregarded the law of the corporate domicile
in determining whether the corporate form should be disregarded." The
81. U.C.C. § 6-102(4) (1972).
82. U.C.C. § 6-103(1)(b) (proposed draft 1988). When a company might be thought to
have more than one place of business, the place of its chief executive office is considered its
principal place of business. Id
83. E.g., Macy v. Oswald, 198 Pa. Super. 435, 439, 182 A.2d 94, 96 (1962); Herrick v.
Robinson, 267 Ark. 576, 588, 595 S.W.2d 637, 645 (1980).
84. Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289, 298-99 (1809); accord Hervey v. Rhode
Island Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664, 668 (1876) (law of situs of property governs fraudulent
conveyances); Knowles Loom Works v. Vacher, 57 N.J.L. 490, 392-94, 31 A. 306, 307 (1895)
(priority in property of corporate debtor). See generally 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraudulent Convey-
ances § 110 (1968); 37 CJ.S. Fraudulent Conveyances § 3 (1943).
85. E.g., Helzer v. F. Joseph Lamb Co., 171 Mich. App. 6, 9-10, 429 N.W.2d 835, 836-37
(1988); Estudios, Proyectose e Inversiones de Centro Am., S.A. v. Swiss Bank Corp. (Over-
seas) S.A., 507 So. 2d 1119, 1120-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1274
(Fla. 1987); Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Co., 75 Or. App. 627, 632-33, 707 P.2d 1250, 1255
(1985), review denied, 300 Or. 546, 715 P.2d 93 (1986); Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 859,
379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 953-54 (Surrogate Court 1975), modified on other grounds sub nom. Will of
Rothko, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd sub nom. In re Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d
305, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449, 372 N.E.2d 291 (1977). Helzer applied Michigan law in a suit brought
by Michigan residents injured in Canada in determining not to disregard the separate existence
of a Canadian corporation. The individual defendant in Estudios created "an intriguing and
complicated network of foreign corporations, which he secretly controls, for the express pur-
pose of hiding his and his family's personal assets from their creditors." 507 So. 2d at 1121.
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most famous of such cases is First National City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba,86 in which the Supreme Court examined
whether two entities could be treated as one for purposes of offsetting a
claim against one against a debt owed to the other. The Court recog-
nized the general rule that the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation
governed.87 The Court found this rule inapplicable, however, when the
rights of third parties were involved 88 or when the use of the corporate
form would defeat legislative policies.89 It ultimately applied American
federal common law and international law to pierce the veil of entities
owned by foreign governments. 90
Building upon these regulations based on the location of the corpo-
ration's external relations, states have recently attempted to use the pres-
ence of the external relations of the corporation to regulate internal
affairs of foreign corporations, especially in the area of anti-takeover leg-
islation.9x California presents a well known example of a state legislative
effort to regulate the internal affairs of foreign corporations. California
applies various corporate governance provisions to those foreign corpora-
tions with substantial ties to the state.92 Section 2115 extends various
corporate governance provisions to foreign corporations subject to the
statute's terms. These provisions include California's cumulative voting
The court pierced the veil. The Oriental Fireworks court pierced the veil in connection with
personal jurisdiction. The court noted third parties' interests in the rules requiring observance
of the corporate form. None of the other cases expressed this concern, and none expressly
considered the possibility that foreign law might govern. Rothko applied veil-piercing rules
without clear distinction between domestic and foreign corporations.
86. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
87. Id. at 621 ('T]he law of the state of incorporation normally determines issues relating
to the internal affairs of a corporation. Application of that body of law achieves the need for
certainty and predictability. . . ." (emphasis in original)).
88. Id. ("Different conflicts principles apply, however, where the rights of third parties
external to the corporation are at issue." (emphasis in original)).
89. Id. at 630 ("[Ihe Court has consistently refused to give effect to the corporate form
where it is interposed to defeat legislative policies.").
90. Id. at 623.
91. In 1968, only one state had an anti-takeover statute; by 1982, thirty-seven states had
such statutes. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 n.6 (1982) (plurality opinion). In
Edgar, the Court invalidated an Illinois statute regulating takeovers of foreign corporations.
The application of the statute could be based on, inter alia, ownership by Illinois shareholders
of 10% of any class of equity securities of the corporation subject to the offer, or on two of
three of the following conditions: a principal executive office in Illinois, organized under the
laws of Illinois, or at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented within the
state. Id. "Typically, any of a number of jurisdictional links might trigger the application of
such an anti-takeover statute: the target's being incorporated in the state, its having a princi-
pal office or major operations in the state, or the existence of a significant number of target
shareholders in the state." R. CLARK, supra note 3, at 569.
92. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West Supp. 1990).
requirement, its standard of care for directors, and its indemnification
provision. The statute's applicability depends upon the property, pay-
roll, and sales factors considered under the state internal revenue code,
and the percentage of the shareholders of record having California
addresses.
93
In Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc.,94 a California Court
of Appeal upheld the application of California's section 2115 cumulative
voting requirement to a Utah corporation. 95 In rejecting a claim that the
California law denied Utah's statute Full Faith and Credit, the court
considered the relative interests of Utah and California. It concluded
that Utah's interest in a laissez faire policy on cumulative voting "would
seem to be clearly outweighed by the interests of California, in which a
majority of shareholders and the corporation's business activity is
located." 96
Washington state recently adopted an anti-takeover statute that at-
tempts to govern foreign corporations.97 The Washington act is a mora-
torium statute, which temporarily restricts an acquiring shareholder's
ability to mortgage or break up the acquired company for short-term
gain or to finance the acquisition debt. The Washington act applies to
domestic corporations with principal executive offices in Washington if
either (1) a majority of their employees, including those of their subsidi-
aries, are Washington residents, or (2) these corporations and their sub-
sidiaries employ more than one thousand state residents.98 The act also
applies to foreign corporations that have their principal executive offices
in Washington if: (1) more than ten percent of their shareholders of rec-
ord are Washington residents, more than ten percent of their shares are
owned by Washington residents, or one thousand or more of their share-
93. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (West Supp. 1990).
94. 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1983).
95. Utah corporations law provided for straight voting, but permitted the use of cumula-
tive voting when the articles of incorporation so provided. Id at 221, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
In cumulative voting,
each shareholder may multiply the number of votes he is entitled to cast (based on
the number of shares held by him) by the number of directors to be elected by the
voting group at the meeting and may cast the product for a single candidate or dis-
tribute the product among two or more candidates. By casting all his votes for a
single candidate or a limited number of candidates, a minority shareholder increases
his voting power and may be able to elect one or more directors.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 7.28 official comment 2 (1984).
96. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 223, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 857. See also Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961) (concluding that the California Com-
missioner of Corporations had jurisdiction to require cumulative voting by a Delaware corpo-
ration which had its principal place of business in California).
97. Callahan & Burman, supra note 10.
98. WASH. REv. CODE § 23B.19.020(13)(a) (1989).
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holders of record reside in Washington; (2) a majority of their employees
are Washington residents or they employ more than one thousand Wash-
ington residents; and (3) a majority of their tangible assets are located in
Washington or they have more than fifty million dollars worth of tangi-
ble assets located in Washington.99
While the potential for conflicting exercises of jurisdiction were al-
ways present in the case of corporations, it remained in the background
because states in which the corporation's assets or agents acted generally
refrained from attacking corporate governance. These statutes, by virtue
of their ubiquity and by attempting to regulate transactions involving a
high degree of planning, make some mechanism for resolving the conflict
imperative.
C. The Inadequacy of the Power Analysis to Determine Jurisdiction to
Prescribe for a Corporation
1. Multiple Sources of Power Make the Power Analysis Ambiguous When
Applied to Corporate Affairs
When corporations operate in more than one state, multiple sources
of jurisdictional power exist. Citizenship (in this case, the state of incor-
poration) and the presence of persons and property (the corporate assets
and employees) all give rise to credible assertions of jurisdiction to pre-
scribe based on a power theory."co The Supreme Court has not resolved
these competing claims, and its past cases suggest no principled resolu-
tion to the conflict between citizenship and the presence of persons and
property.
In Kidd v. Alabama, the Court allowed the double taxation of in-
tangibles by two different states because neither state's theory of the loca-
tion of the assets could be shown to be repugnant to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.101 In Blackstone v. Miller,102 the Court addressed the as-
sertion of competing power-based claims and allowed both the domicile
of the decedent and the situs of property in the decedent's estate to tax
the property.
99. Id. § 23B.19.020(13)(b) (1989).
100. While this conflict potentially exists when a natural person acts or owns property
outside her domicile, the conflict is more acute for corporations, which may choose a state of
incorporation for the purpose of avoiding requirements imposed by its principal place of
business.
101. 188 U.S. 730, 732 (1903) (Holmes, J.). The case involved a tax on stock. Id. at 731.
Alabama taxed on the basis of the location of the owner of the stock; other states taxed on the
location of the tangible property that made the stock valuable. Id. at 732.
102. 188 U.S. 189 (1903) (Holmes, J.).
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[No one doubts that succession to a tangible chattel may be taxed
wherever the property is found, and none the less that the law of
the situs accepts its rules of succession from the law of the domicil,
or that by the law of the domicil the chattel is part of a universitas
and is taken into account again in the succession tax there."03
Indeed, the Court even rejected an attempt to police an internal inconsis-
tency in New York's law, which sought to tax both on the basis of the
decedent's domicile and the situs of property."°4 By allowing the exercise
of jurisdiction by both the state of organization and the state where the
assets of the organization were located, the Supreme Court's opinions
suggested that it would refuse to resolve the conflicting duties placed on
corporations by different states' laws.
Moreover, even when the Supreme Court's cases suggested a solu-
tion in principle, it could often be difficult to discern that solution in
advance. The Supreme Court held that an equity court could adjudicate
rights in land, albeit not ultimately conveying title, if it had jurisdiction
over the person.'0 To convey title, however, the court must compel the
person conveying title to observe the proper forms. In Fall v. Eastin, °6
the Court held that a conveyance executed by a commissioner appointed
to do the task was not entitled to extraterritorial effect. 107 Thus, the trial
court's attempt to assert jurisdiction to prescribe failed because the trial
court did not realize that giving extraterritorial effect to the decree neces-
sitated imprisoning the defendant until he signed, rather than simply ap-
pointing a commissioner to do the signing. In Selover, Bates & Co. v.
Walsh,'0 8 a contract for sale of land in Colorado was signed in South
Dakota by the buyer, then signed in Minnesota by the seller. Payments
103. Id. at 204.
104. It may be regretted, also, that one and the same State should be seen taxing on
the one hand according to the fact of power, and on the other, at the same time,
according to the fiction that, in successions after death, mobilia sequunturpersonam
and domicil governs the whole. But these inconsistencies infringe no rule of constitu-
tional law.
Id. at 205.
105. Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 158 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.), held that "the
principles of equity give a court jurisdiction wherever the person may be found." This jurisdic-
tion, however, is limited to cases of fraud, of trust, or of contract. IA at 160. Pennoyer v. Neff
limits this jurisdiction over people to those domiciled in the jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
106. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
107. "The deed executed by the commissioner in this case must be considered as
forming part of the proceedings in the court of chancery, and no greater effect can be
given to it than if the decree itself, by statute, was made to operate as a conveyance in
Kentucky as it does in Ohio."
Id at 8-9 (quoting Watts v. Waddle, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 389, 400-01 (1832) (minor alterations by
Fall Court)).
108. 226 U.S. 112 (1912).
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were to be made in the seller's office in Minnesota. The seller tried to
forfeit the land and sold it to another. The buyer sued in the Minnesota
courts and won, based on a Minnesota statute requiring notice and a
chance to cure before the forfeiture of a buyer's interest in real estate.
The Court classified the right involved as personal and contractual be-
cause the buyer did not seek reconveyance of the land.10 9 Therefore, the
law of the state of contracting was permitted to govern. The Court's
opinion suggested that the law of the situs would govern if the buyer had
sought reconveyance.11° Both Fall and Walsh were decided by divided
Courts, suggesting the uncertainty surrounding the application of tradi-
tional doctrine.
2. This Ambiguity Was Compounded by the Application of Different
Rules for Determining the Situs
The ambiguity of the power theory was aggravated by the Supreme
Court's failure to impose consistent rules for determining the situs of
properties and consistent applications of these rules. For example, Dela-
ware's characterization of the situs of stock as the state of incorpora-
tion111 would give it jurisdictional power even though another state
asserted jurisdiction based on the presence of physical stock certificates
or the location of the actions giving rise to the litigation.' 12 In another
case, the Court noted four different rules for taxing negotiable
instruments.
1 3
Different characterizations of the situs could lead to conflicting re-
sults even when two states both based jurisdiction on domicile or the
presence of property. The problem was especially great when intangibles
were involved because of the impossibility of physically locating them
within a jurisdiction for a court to apply the power theory.
In a number of cases, the Court permitted dual taxation of estates
because of conflicting determinations of domicile,114 even though domi-
cile has been held in other contexts to be a jurisdictional fact capable of
being relitigated. 115
109. ItL at 123.
110. Id. at 124.
111. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
112. Delaware's rule was apparently unique. See id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 208 (1930).
114. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 297 (1937); Cory v. White, 457
U.S. 85, 89 (1982) ("inconsistent determinations by the courts of two States as to the domicile
of a taxpayer d[o] not raise a substantial federal constitutional question").
115. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
3. The Power Analysis Is Tautological
Within the context of a multi-state federal system, a power analysis
is ultimately tautological. What states can decide depends on what the
Supreme Court lets them decide. Just as the Supreme Court in Pennoyer
v. Neff 116 prohibited the states from exercising power unless they pro-
vided notice and opportunity to be heard, it could have prohibited their
exercising power unless they satisfied the requirements of a reasonable
connection with the forum that were later enunciated in Hanson v.
Denckla.117 So, too, could the Supreme Court reject assertions of juris-
diction to prescribe unless they satisfy considerations of fairness and
convenience.
4. The Inability of the Power Theory to Resolve the Dilemma Creates a
Constitutional Difficulty
The inability to predict what law will govern creates a constitutional
problem."1 8 In the context of Full Faith and Credit and Due Process,
that problem has generally meant the application of a rule of law that the
parties could not have predicted would apply." 9 The due process di-
lemma, however, also exists in situations in which it is impossible to pre-
dict which of two laws will apply. This has arisen most clearly in areas
of vertical conflicts of law, between federal and state law in a federal
system. The famous decision of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins1 20 was in Jus-
tice Brandeis' view a constitutional decision based on the need to avoid
the uncertainty resulting from the impossibility of determining whether
state or federal law would apply to a transaction. 2' As Justice Harlan
wrote, "Erie recognized that there should not be two conflicting systems
of law controlling the primary activity of citizens, for such alternative
governing authority must necessarily give rise to a debilitating uncer-
116. 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1877).
117. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
118. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
119. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (Texas law applied to a dispute
involving a fire insurance policy issued and to be performed in Mexico, for a Texan residing in
Mexico; policy was covered in part by reinsurance effected in Mexico or New York by New
York companies licensed to do business in Texas).
120. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
121. Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law
prevented uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of de-
marcation between the province of general law and that of local law developed a new
well of uncertainties.... [Tihe doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the
law.
Id. at 74-75 (footnotes omitted). Cf ia at 74 n.8 (" 'Probably no decision of the Court has
ever given rise to more uncertainty as to legal rights... .'" (quoting 2 C. WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISToRY 89 (rev. ed. 1935))).
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tainty in the planning of everyday affairs." 1 2 2
The uncertainty in corporate law is greater than the uncertainty cre-
ated by the inability to determine whether state or federal law would
apply before Erie. In such conflicts, the court deciding the case would be
able conclusively to determine what law to apply. By contrast, any state
needing to regulate a shareholder's rights in a corporation may well lack
the jurisdiction over the shareholder necessary to resolve conclusively the
governing law. This is because personal jurisdiction cannot be based on
the mere ownership of stock in a corporation subject to personal jurisdic-
tion. 123 Consequently, even a final judgment by the state of incorpora-
tion or by the state of the principal place of business may not remove the
uncertainty over what law governs.
II. The Proposed Solution: The Universality Requirement
A. Proposed Rule: A State Can Claim Jurisdiction to Prescribe Only
on the Basis of Circumstances That Would Lead It to
Recognize Another State's Assertion of Jurisdiction
Under the rule we propose, a state may assert jurisdiction only on
the basis of circumstances that would lead it to recognize another state's
jurisdiction. For example, if a state regulates a corporation because it is
incorporated in the state, it must allow another state to regulate corpora-
tions incorporated in that state. Conversely, if a state regulates a corpo-
ration because it has its principal place of business within the state, it
must recognize another state's regulation of a corporation with its princi-
pal place of business in that state. Under this rule, a state must adopt
one set of principles for determining both when it will exercise jurisdic-
tion to prescribe and when it will recognize jurisdiction to prescribe. It
cannot exercise jurisdiction to prescribe on the basis of facts that would
not cause it to recognize another state's jurisdiction to prescribe.
The essential characteristic of the rule is that a state can assert juris-
diction only on the basis of criteria which could be used at the same time
122. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
123. E.g., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1925); Consoli-
dated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 88 (1933). See also Volkswagenwerk Aktien-
gesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 n.* (1988) (citing these cases and stating that "it is
not self-evident that substituted service on a subsidiary is sufficient with respect to the par-
ent"). Courts have denied attempts to assert personal jurisdiction as to a defendant contem-
plating the purchase of stock in a corporation with its principal place of business in the forum.
Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 773 (5th Cir. 1988). Moreover, the
state of incorporation cannot claim quasi in rem jurisdiction merely on the basis of a share-
holder's ownership of shares in the corporation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977).
The state of the principal place of business has no better claim to jurisdiction to adjudicate.
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by all states without creating a conflict. 24 We call this the "universal-
ity" requirement. The proposed rule works as follows: Consider a stat-
ute claiming to permit corporations incorporated in the state or having
fifty percent of their assets within the state to issue poison pill preferred
stock.125 Under our approach, this statute would be invalid because a
corporation could be incorporated under one state's laws, but have most
of its assets in another. Under such circumstances, both states could
have the same legislation and assert jurisdiction, creating a conflict. By
contrast, an assertion of jurisdiction solely on the basis of the state of
incorporation would be valid, because a corporation is incorporated only
in one state. Similarly, an assertion of jurisdiction solely on the basis of
principal place of business would also be valid, because a corporation can
only have one principal place of business.
The rule does not consider the ability to comply with both regula-
tions. The bare ability to satisfy both states' regulations would lead to
the displacement of state laws giving discretion to the corporation.1
2 6
For example, if ability to comply with both regulations were the stan-
124. The formulation is similar to that of Kant's categorical imperative. See I. KANT,
TUGENDLEHRE 388 (1797), translated in I. KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE 48 (M.J. Gre-
gor trans. 1964) ("So act that the maxim of your action could become a universal law."); I.
KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR METAPHYSIK DER SrrrEN 52 (2d ed. 1803), translated in I.
KANT, THE GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 88 (H.J. Paton trans. 1964)
(same). For Kant, the categorical imperative served the purpose of providing a law for all
rational beings, not just humans, without regard to their feelings, propensities, and desires. See
I. KANT, KRITIK DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUNFT 8-9 & 9 n.7 (1788), translated in I. KANT,
THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 8-9 & 9 n.7 (L. Beck trans. 1956). Our universality
requirement serves the purpose of eliminating inappropriate assertions of jurisdiction without
the need to pass judgment on the policies underlying the particular schemes by which a state
asserts jurisdiction. Cf Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1978) (declining to
impose uniform rules for the taxation of interstate business because it would require the Court
to consider political factors).
125. The Delaware Supreme Court has defined the term "poison pill" as referring to "a'
plan by which shareholders receive the right to be bought out by the corporation at a substan-
tial premium on the occurrence of a stated triggering event." Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986). In practice, a triggering event is the
tender offer or the acquisition of a substantial portion of a corporation's stock by someone else.
In that event, the right to be bought out reduces the value of the stock already purchased. See
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985). Other variations of the
poison pill exist; all work by decreasing the value of the acquisition to the acquiror, either by
diluting stock in the acquired company or by diluting stock in the acquiror. See R. CLARK,
supra note 3, at 575.
126. This differs from the approach under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2. Congress, unlike a state, has undoubted power to displace state regulation. Because federal
power is interstitial, however, "federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed
preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons--either that the
nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has
unmistakably so ordained." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142 (1963).
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dard, states with mandatory cumulative voting would have their rule ap-
ply despite the preference of other states for letting corporations decide
for themselves whether to adopt cumulative voting.
The rule, however, does consider nonexclusivity. States may not
wish to preclude other states' legislation. For example, a state could re-
quire reporting of corporations on the basis of presence of property, pres-
ence of shareholders, and state of incorporation. The state may not
claim that its regulation is exclusive, and it may not object to other
states' requiring additional reporting. When one state does not intend to
make its assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe exclusive, no conflict arises
and the test involved here will be satisfied.
127
Even liability-creating provisions may be nonexclusive, because one
state may not intend to preclude an injured plaintiff from taking advan-
tage of another jurisdiction's more favorable laws. In this respect the
rule follows the Supreme Court's decisions in worker's compensation
cases. In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion,121 the Court allowed California to apply its own worker's compen-
sation law to an accident that took place in Alaska because the
employment contract was entered into in California. In a subsequent
case, Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion, 29 the employee resided in and entered into the contract of employ-
ment in Massachusetts, but the Court upheld the application of
California law because California was the place of the injury. TheAlaska
Packers Court noted that the California statute did not evince an intent
to preclude the employees from relying on law elsewhere if they chose.
130
The plaintiff's ability to choose between two forums in Alaska Packers
and Pacific Employers Insurance is consistent with the analysis suggested
here. In those cases, neither California nor Alaska had a policy barring
the plaintiff from suing in the other state.131 States may not wish to limit
127. The New York statutes appear to satisfy this requirement. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 1306, 1315-1320 (McKinney 1986) (imposing disclosure requirements on foreign corpora-
tions and setting forth liability rules governing them).
128. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
129. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
130. We assume that in Alaska the employee, had he chosen to do so, could have
claimed the benefits of the Alaska statute, and that if any effect were there given to
the California statute, it would be only by comity or by virtue of the full faith and
credit clause.
294 U.S. at 540.
131. Although the Supreme Court's determination that these statutes are nonexclusive is
only a matter of interpretation, it is sound interpretation. Worker's compensation statutes are
primarily remedial. No doubt interpretation of the statutes as not intending to be exclusive is
fortified by their limitation to remedial rights, not primary rights. Cf Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (distinguishing between primary planning activi-
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recovery to the amount provided for by their laws. -
While the Court has not considered an analogous case arising under
common law, there is little doubt that courts apply conflict of laws rules
in such cases to favor the plaintiffs. This is because tort rules generally
combine two motives, deterrence and compensation. The state of the si-
tus of the accident cannot object if the parties' domicile wishes to deter
conduct by providing a greater recovery for the plaintiff. 132 Conversely,
the strong compensatory motives underlying most of modem tort law
suggest that the compensatory goals of the plaintiff's forum choice be
preferred if the primary purpose of the tort rule in question is to compen-
sate victims for their injuries. 13 3 Under the liberal test for approving
state decisions in choice of laws, these state rules for choosing law will be
approved.1 34 Worker's compensation tribunals, however, will not apply
choice of law doctrines. 135 Thus, the only way to choose laws in a
worker's compensation case is to choose jurisdictions. Alaska Packers
and Pacific Employers Insurance simply achieve the same result that
could have been achieved under a common law system for choice of laws
in a case in which the forum only applies its own laws.
Because a nonexclusive regulation is not subject to invalidation
under the internal consistency requirement, legislatures may label their
regulations as nonexclusive to give them extraterritorial effect. This la-
belling is unlikely to create difficulties in practice. First, the label that a
legislature attaches to a statute is not conclusive. Courts should engage
in the same analysis the Supreme Court used in Alaska Packers.136 A
statute's effect may necessarily be exclusive. For example, it may provide
for mandatory cumulative voting in elections to the board of directors.
ties and those not influenced by legal rules). This makes any claim by an employer that it was
relying on the exclusivity of one state's remedy implausible.
132. See, eg., Hurtado v. Superior Court, I1 Cal. 3d 574, 580-81,522 P.2d 666, 670, 114
Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (1974); Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 582-83, 555
P.2d 997, 1002 (1976).
133. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 comment c (1971);
Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 866-67, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953) (Traynor, 3.) (citing
compensatory purposes of tort law in characterizing the survivability of a claim against a
tortfeasor as procedural in order to allow the plaintiff's claim to proceed); Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1963).
134. "MFor a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible man-
ner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." All-
state Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion), quoted in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 7, topic 3 introductory note
(1971) ("A peculiarity of the area [of worker's compensation] is that usually relief under a
particular statute may be obtained only in the state of its enactment.").
136. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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Such a statute is inconsistent with statutes prohibiting cumulative voting
or permitting corporations to choose other methods of voting. A legisla-
ture cannot avoid the effect of the internal consistency requirement by
labelling the statute nonexclusive. Second, the structure of the universal-
ity requirement provides a disincentive to label one's preferences falsely.
If State X treats its rule as nonexclusive, another state's regulations will
be enforceable even in State X because State X's statute does not preclude
the other law.
More fundamental problems occur when one state is genuinely will-
ing to treat its law as nonexclusive, but other states oppose the nonexclu-
sive label because they perceive the law to have undesirable substantive
effects. For example, State X might view its disclosure regulations as
nonexclusive and be willing to accept other states' disclosure regulations.
Other states, however, may believe that State X's disclosure regulations
discourage takeovers by minimizing the value of identifying a company
whose value could be improved by better management. 137 Because these
states view State X's regulation as having adverse substantive effects,
they will reject the nonexclusive characterization of these disclosure reg-
ulations. States that consider limited disclosure to embody a substantive
policy about the benefits of disclosure will have to treat their regulations
as exclusive. Thus, their rules about disclosure must satisfy the internal
consistency requirement. This will limit the possibility of conflicts.
Suppose, however, that State X believes in broad disclosure and has
enacted nonexclusive legislation requiring broad disclosure whenever a
corporation is incorporated in or has its principal place of business in
State X. State Y permits limited disclosure as a substantive policy. It
enacts legislation to govern corporations incorporated in the state that
allows management to limit disclosure. A corporation that is incorpo-
rated in State Y, but has its principal place of business in State X, will be
subject to conflicting demands.
There are two possibilities within the framework of the internal con-
sistency requirement. First, a regulation domestically treated as nonex-
clusive could be treated universally as nonexclusive. This promotes the
interests of nonexclusive regulators over those of exclusive regulators.
While this is a different kind of bias than the one against states that pre-
fer to confer discretion on the corporation, such a rule will tend to pro-
mote the interests of one class of regulators: states favoring disclosure
requirements and other rules that can be seen as nonexclusive. One argu-
ment in favor of such a result is that it satisfies at least an equal number
137. R. CLARK, supra note 3, at 590 (discussing the possibility that disclosure would give
rival bidders a free ride on others' search efforts).
of states as the other requirements. Only one state's exclusive regulations
necessarily can be satisfied, but all nonexclusively regulating states con-
cerned may have their regulations satisfied.
Alternatively, a regulation domestically treated as exclusive could
be treated universally as exclusive. This would treat the nonexclusive
regulation as exclusive. If this result is adopted, it may be reasonable to
allow states favoring disclosure to enact a fallback position that would
govern conflicts with states that have exclusive regulations. The fallback
position would state a ground for priority. For example, a state could
say that its regulation was generally to be treated as nonexclusive, but
that if it came into conflict with another state's exclusive regulation, it
would prefer to regulate on the basis of the principal place of business.
Of course, this solution would not eliminate the possibility of conflicts.
In the example given above, if State X prefers to regulate on the basis of
principal place of business, the conflict will continue.
We believe that for purposes of the universality requirement, a
state's characterization of its regulations as exclusive should govern.
Otherwise, the strongly held concerns of the state with most ties to the
corporation could have its laws displaced by the laws of a state with only
a minor connection to the corporation. This leaves the problem to be
resolved under conventional conflict of laws rules.
138
Another problem occurs when one state is able to regulate on the
basis of internal events, but the regulation has substantial external conse-
quences. No doubt a state may regulate the transfer of property within
the state, even if the property is owned by a foreign corporation, without
violating the internal consistency requirement. For example, a state may
legitimately enact laws to protect creditors against bulk sales without
worrying about the impact of the law on foreign corporations.1 39 Be-
cause the laws' effects are confined to property located in the state and
138. Under those rules, it is improbable that the state of incorporation could displace the
law of other states merely by being the state of incorporation. First, the interests of all states
favoring disclosure would be aggregated. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 145 comment i (1971) (torts); id. § 186 comment c (torts). Second, the principle
underlying the internal affairs doctrine is primarily one of preventing inconsistency and unfair
surprise, not the state of incorporation's interest in regulating the corporation. Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 n.44 (1977). Third, when protective laws are concerned, courts are
reluctant to displace the law of concerned states through the stipulation of a governing law.
See supra note 8. These principles suggest that the courts will refuse to allow a corporation to
claim the protection of a doctrine designed to avoid uncertainty when the corporation's own
actions in incorporating in a jurisdiction without any ties to the activities of the corporation
created the uncertainty.
139. Typical bulk sales laws are based on article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
U.C.C. art. 6 (1972).
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the state accepts the application of other states' laws to property located
elsewhere, it passes the internal consistency requirement.
Anti-takeover legislation frequently limits the corporation's ability
to alienate assets after a takeover.1" Other anti-takeover statutes require
foreign corporations that have been acquired against the wishes of the
incumbent board to confer special benefits on employees.14 If the laws'
effects were confined to employees and property located in the state and
the state accepted the application of other states' laws to property located
elsewhere, the law might be thought to satisfy the universality require-
ment. One defending the validity of these statutes might argue that they
apply only to employees or property located in the state. Thus, the argu-
ment would continue, it passes muster under the universality require-
ment even though these states generally regulate corporations according
to their state of incorporation.
However, this is not the case. The statutes base their effect on a
change of status (the acquisition of stock) with extraterritorial connec-
tions. The concern of the states adopting such legislation is not the wel-
fare of creditors and employees generally, because these statutes do not
apply to corporations generally. Consequently, the purpose of these stat-
utes is to penalize on the basis of actions that could not be regulated
directly. This is invalid. 42
The resolution of the attempts to regulate on the basis of property
illustrates that the internal consistency requirement, like ordinary con-
flict of laws rules, will rely on depecage to be workable.143 Secured trans-
actions and bulk sales may be regulated by the state in which the
140. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.19.040 (1989) (prohibiting significant business transac-
tions following an acquisition unless the transaction was approved by the board before the
acquisition); id. § 23B.19.020(9)(a) (defining significant business transaction to include disposi-
tions of five percent or more of the target corporation's assets).
141. Act of Apr. 27, 1990, Act No. 1990-36, sec. 6, §§ 2581-2588, 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv.
114-18 (Purdon) (to be codified at 15 PA. CoNs. STAT. §§ 2581-2588). "Registered corpora-
tions" are defined to include domestic corporations and their subsidiaries. 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2502 (Purdon Supp. 1990) (as amended by Act of Apr. 27, 1990, Act No. 1990-36, sec. 4,
§ 2502, 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 100 (Purdon)). The provisions protecting employees expressly
extend to foreign subsidiaries of registered corporations. Act of Apr. 27, 1990, Act No. 1990-
36, see. 6, §§ 2581, 2585(a), 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 115, 117 (Purdon) (to be codified at 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 2581 (defining eligible employees as employees of a registered corporation or
of a subsidiary of a registered corporation), 2585(a) (covering registered corporations and their
subsidiaries)).
142. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (states cannot condition consent to do-
ing business on demands that interfere with the rights of other states); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-14, at 439 n.5 (2d ed. 1988) (noting source of the modem doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions in the cases discussed supra notes 70-72).
143. Broome v. Antlers' Hunting Club, 595 F.2d 921, 923 n.5 (3d Cir. 1979) (defining
depecage as "the process whereby different issues in a single case arising out of a single set of
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property involved is located without forcing that state to regulate on the
basis of property, rather than domicile, as to all transactions.
Procedural issues are governed by the same principles used for the
remaining analysis. When an issue is truly procedural, in the sense that
it can have no effect on an outcome, 144 there can be no objection to hav-
ing any state's law govern, so long as it is clear which state's law governs.
If a bias in favor of the state of incorporation for procedural issues exists,
there would be controversy over what issues qualified as procedural.145
This controversy is especially likely because it is impossible to establish a
neutral election procedure. 1" The need to have a clearly applicable law
is more pressing in the area of procedure than elsewhere because of the
need to know who has authority to make decisions for the corporation.
This suggests the need to determine a procedure relatively quickly, even
at the cost of some arbitrariness.147 Fortunately, states do not seem ea-
facts are decided according to the laws of different states" (citing R. LEFLAR, supra note 31, at
221)).
144. A purely procedural rule may be described as one that can be satisfied so long as one
knows in advance what the rule requires. With purely procedural rules either in conflicts
under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), or in horizontal conflicts, there will gener-
ally be an obvious rule to apply. This may not be the case in conflicts between the laws of the
state of incorporation and the state of the principal place of business.
145. A variety of apparently procedural rules have nonprocedural implications. For exam-
ple, cumulative voting and staggered terms for boards of directors may initially be adopted out
of a sense of fairness or to preserve continuity in management. These same provisions also will
have a predictable substantive effect in a hostile takeover.
Other rules may turn out to affect a takeover, although it may be impossible to determine
whom the rules favor in advance. For example, long or short notice for stockholder meetings
may permit adoption of devices designed to stymie a takeover, but may make it possible for
someone who does acquire a majority control to remove incumbent management quickly.
Rules for multicandidate director elections, the principle example of the effect that election
rules can have on results, also fall in such a category. KJ. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES ch. 2 (2d ed. 1963). Thus, we believe that the cases refusing to defer to
arguably procedural rules with substantive consequences are correct. Western Air Lines, Inc.
v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961) (applying California law to a
Delaware corporation to prevent the corporation from eliminating cumulative voting); Wilson
v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1983) (apply-
ing California's cumulative voting law to a Utah corporation although the corporation's arti-
cles of incorporation and bylaws did not provide for cumulative voting).
146. K.J. ARROW, supra note 145; R.D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS, ch.
14 (1958). If such a procedure existed, a legislature could mandate it constitutionally in multi-
state cases.
147. The cases suggest that states may have a duty quickly to inform foreign corporations
that the state will seek to govern them by domestic law. In Order of United Commercial
Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947), the Court held that the forum state could not
use its own statute of limitations when that was inconsistent with the articles of incorporation
of a fraternal benefit organization. The case suggests that, while a state might deny such a
corporation admittance, it could not "recognize an action to collect the full benefits to be
derived from a membership in the petitioner society, while, at the same time, nullifying other
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ger to propose revisions of purely procedural rules in their efforts to pre-
vent takeovers.
B. Benefits of the Universality Requirement
The proposed rule satisfies a number of important criteria. First, it
respects the constitutional and practical limits on judicial action. The
courts do not generally review the policy basis of state anti-takeover leg-
islation. 148  Unfortunately, determining the priority of different states'
legislation with respect to corporate transactions requires evaluating and
balancing the conflicting policies underlying state laws. 149 To minimize
judicial scrutiny of the substantive policies of the states, any rule for de-
termining which state's law governs should, if possible, be neutral with
respect to the substantive laws of the states. This rule satisfies this re-
quirement by avoiding consideration of state policies. This preserves a
maximum of state autonomy.' 50
Because the rule only requires looking at the face of a statute, it
reduces the burdens on the Supreme Court. This has long been a con-
cer.151 It also minimizes the likelihood of incorrect results. Assessing
state policies requires the Court to apply unfamiliar state laws and unfa-
miliar and complex state conflict-of-laws doctrines. The simplicity of the
proposed rule avoids these difficulties. It also avoids committing the
Supreme Court to a particular theory of conflict of laws on a constitu-
tional level before sufficient experience has determined the most appro-
priate rules.152
integral terms of the same membership." Id. at 624-25; see also id. at 632 (Black, J., dissent-
ing) ("South Dakota officials could have excluded this corporation from doing business in the
state or could have revoked its license upon discovery of the foreign corporations violations of
the laws of the state.").
148. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987) (declining "'to
second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation'" with
respect to corporate takeovers (quoting Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662, 679 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b), (c) (1971).
150. In the analogous area of state taxation, Justice Stevens observed that a scheme to
prevent duplicative taxation would require "national uniform rules for the division of income."
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 279 (1978). Although such a scheme would advance
the policies of the Commerce Clause, any particular scheme would require a decision based in
part upon political factors. Id. Such policy decisions are appropriate for the Congress, not the
Court. Id. at 280.
151. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 & n.15 (1983);
Dodd, supra note 8, at 562 (questioning the Supreme Court's ability to introduce uniformity
without burdening itself with a flood of unimportant litigation).
152. "If we abandon the currently applied, traditional notions of such entitlement [to legis-
late,] we would embark upon the enterprise of constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules with no
compass to guide us beyond our own perceptions of what seems desirable." Sun Oil Co. v.
Second, it is predictable. One of the main reasons for requiring a
principled solution to the conflict of laws problem is to facilitate the plan-
ning of transactions.153 A test that produces highly indeterminate results
would not serve that purpose.1 54 The comparative predictability of the
rule has beneficial results in public as well as private planning. Because it
provides a clear and predictable rule, legislatures can decide when state
policies require the assertion of jurisdiction and gives them some ability
to be sure their enactments are valid.
Finally, approaching the problem of conflicting regulation under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause allows Congress to act. 155 The rule that the
enforceability of public acts depends on their enforceability in the state of
rendering is only a statutory rule, which Congress can modify.156 By
contrast, decisions under the Due Process Clause leave little scope for
congressional revision.15
7
This test has its limits. Most obviously, states can still maintain dif-
ferent laws that will create jurisdictional conflicts. The failure of the test
to resolve all conflicts, however, is hardly an appropriate objection to
using it to invalidate assertions of jurisdiction to prescribe that inherently
generate conflicts. Cases not resolved through the universality require-
ment will have to be resolved through the application of conventional
choice of law rules. The constitutional limits imposed on states in such a
case are relatively few.1 58 The Court currently recognizes that a situa-
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988). "In a rapidly developing area, such as choice of law, it
is often more important that good rules be developed than that predictability and uniformity of
result should be assured through continued adherence to existing rules." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment i (1971).
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(f) (1971). "Predictabil-
ity and uniformity of result are of particular importance in areas where the parties are likely to
give advance thought to the legal consequences of their transactions." Id comment i.
154. Unfortunately, much of the area of conflict of laws is necessarily uncertain. The main
section outlining principles of conflicts, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6
(1971), requires application of a multi-factor balancing test. This "leaves the answer to specific
problems very much at large" and "recogniz[es] that there may be room for different solu-
tions." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS introduction vii (1971).
155. The Clause expressly provides for congressional action to determine the effect of ex-
traterritorial "public Acts, Records, and Proceedings." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
156. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273 (1935).
157. In ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982), the Court relied
on the Due Process Clause. As the dissent charged, 458 U.S. at 331 (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
and the majority acknowledged, 458 U.S. at 327 n.23, this suggested that limits on state power
to tax could not be altered by Congress.
158. "[I]n many situations a state court may be free to apply one of several choices of law."
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985). However, an attempt by a state to
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tion in which more than one state's law can be applied is the norm." 9
Indeed, deference to state rules of choice of law is part of accepted
Supreme Court jurisprudence, even when it would not be necessary to
rely on constitutional grounds to adopt different rules." The combina-
tion of the universality requirement with traditional approaches to choice
of laws, however, has the advantage of invalidating both assertions of
jurisdiction that are facially invalid because they seek to regulate transac-
tions according to a rule that inherently generates conflicts and assertions
of jurisdiction that are unreasonable as applied. 6 The Full Faith and
regulate transactions involving only out-of-state shareholders and an out-of-state corporation
is invalid. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987).
Other constitutional limitations in takeover situations generally will not depend on the
multi-state nature of the transaction. However, certain policies against disappointment of con-
tractual expectations may apply with added force in the multi-state situation. Initially, corpo-
rate charters were contracts that could not be modified by the states granting them. Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 643-44 (1819). This prohibition
could be avoided by the states' reserving the power to modify the charter. See Salt Co. v. East
Saginaw, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 373, 378 (1872). It may be argued that because a non-incorporat-
ing state has not reserved the power to modify the contract, an alteration of the contract that
reduces the rights of shareholders is more likely to violate the Contract Clause. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
States also may have more power to alter contracts initially regulated by their law than
they do contracts associated with other states. Compare Order of United Commercial Travel-
ers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 624-25 (1947) (a state may deny a fraternal benefit corpora-
tion admittance, but it could not alter the terms of the contract of a shareholder-beneficiary by
"recogniz[ing] an action to collect the full benefits to be derived from a membership in the
petitioner society, while, at the same time, nullifying other integral terms of the same member-
ship" by refusing to apply the organization's limitation period to a domiciliary) and Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1930) (the forum could not apply its law prohibiting a
shortening of the time in which suit could be brought under an insurance contract absent some
other connection with the transaction) with Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724-27
(1988) (the forum may apply its own statute of limitations to a suit with no other connection to
the forum) and Home Ins. Co., 281 U.S. at 407 (state may prohibit contractual terms in con-
tracts within the state) and Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 206-07 (1819) (a
jurisdiction may alter the limitations period on a contract) and Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S.
620, 628-29 (1885) (same).
159. "[S]ince the legislative jurisdictions of the States overlap, it is frequently the case
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply either the law of one
State or the contrary law of another." Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988).
160. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (requiring federal
courts to follow state conflicts rules in diversity cases); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner,
423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (re-affirming Klaxon).
161. For example, when the fact of incorporation is the sole contact with the state of incor-
poration, a state that is the source of all the other contacts of the corporation will have a strong
claim to apply its law. See, e.g., Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d
216, 221, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 855 (1983) (applying California's cumulative voting law, because
the corporation's sale, payroll, and property each were at least 50% in California, to a Utah
corporation although the corporation's articles of incorporation and bylaws did not provide for
cumulative voting). Conversely, when many states share the business facilities of the corpora-
tion, the claim of the state of incorporation is especially strong.
Credit Clause expressly allows Congress to address any further
difficulties.
C. Consistency With Past Decisions of the Supreme Court
The rule we suggest here, while extending past full faith and credit
decisions, is consistent with the Court's understanding of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, its resolution of conflicts created by state taxing
schemes under the Commerce Clause, and its choice-of-law approach in
federal common law. Moreover, this approach is consistent with two
broad themes underlying the Court's resolution of other problems arising
from the existence of multiple jurisdictions in a federal system.
First, it is consistent with the Court's commitment to a policy-neu-
tral application of the law. That commitment requires a mechanism
whereby the Court can assess the legitimacy of legislation without regard
to its content. The Court has frequently expressed its reluctance to as-
sess the merits of the policy decisions on which the legislation is based.162
Second, this approach is consistent with the Court's decreased reli-
ance on presence and its increased reliance on policy considerations. In
part this comes from the Court's realization that rules adopted to resolve
conflicts of laws between countries, for which there are no mechanisms
for coordination between political units, provide an inappropriate model
for federal jurisdictions.163 The advantage of a unified system is that it
allows the courts to focus more on fairness and convenience.
1. Tax Cases Under the Commerce Clause
Cases interpreting the taxing power of the states under the Com-
merce Clause present problems similar to those arising in cases determin-
ing jurisdiction to prescribe under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. One
reason for this similarity is that the taxing power is simply a special case
of the power to prescribe.
Second, the analysis of taxing power under the Commerce Clause is
quite similar to that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In the case
162. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987) (declining "'to
second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation'" with
respect to corporate takeovers (quoting Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662, 679 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring))). "When the action of a Legislature is within the
scope of its power, fairly debatable questions as to its reasonableness, wisdom, and propriety
are not for the determination of courts, but for the legislative body.... ." South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros. Co., 303 U.S. 177, 190-91 (1938).
163. This is shown by the difference in treatment of the Interstate Commerce Clause, in
which the Supreme Court is able to reconcile the claims of different states, and the Foreign
Commerce Clause, in which there is no mechanism for reconciling the claims of different coun-
tries. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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of the Commerce Clause, the taxing jurisdiction must show a "' "mini-
mal connection" or "nexus" between the interstate activities and the tax-
ing State, and "a rational relationship between the income attributed to
the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise."' ,164 This test is
similar to the significant connection test used under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, 165 albeit with an added element of apportionment. In-
deed, the Court has equated the commerce clause test with that under
the Due Process Clause, 166 which the Court has in turn equated with the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.16 7
Third, both the Commerce Clause and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause present areas in which the Court's decisions can be changed by
Congress. They thus represent an area in which the Court legitimately
can defer substantive policy choices to Congress. This ability to defer
suggests a similar need for content-neutral rules.
Formerly, the ability of a state to tax extraterritorial entities was
based on the presence of the property in the state.1 68 While states could
164. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1983) (quoting
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980) (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980) (minor alteration by Exxon
Court))).
165. See supra note 134.
166. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 164 (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n,
458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982)).
167. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion). The rationale of the tax cases,
however, is "the principle that no State may discriminate against interstate commerce by en-
acting a tax which provides a competitive advantage to local business." American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 269 (1987). Scheiner describes the conflicting policies as
"unrestricted access to the national market" and "each State's authority to collect its fair share
of revenues from interstate commercial activity." Id This explanation of the source of com-
merce clause power is sufficiently different from the source of power under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to suggest that the coincidence in standards should not be relied upon. How-
ever, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires, at the least, adherence to due process. See
supra note 8. Consequently, the difference in the source of the standards is irrelevant.
168. "It is... essential to the validity of a tax that the property shall be within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the taxing power." Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S.
194, 204 (1905). "Personal property, as this court has declared again and again, may be taxed,
either at the domicile of its owner, or at the place where the property is situated, even if the
owner is neither a citizen nor a resident of the state which imposes the tax." Savings & Loan
Soc'y v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421, 427 (1898) (citations omitted).
The Union Refrigerator Court noted an exception for "intangible property," as to which
there is no way that "its existence or ownership can be ascertained in the State of its situs."
199 U.S. at 205. In such cases, "the property may be taxed at the domicil of the owner," id.,
or, "in the case of mortgages, in the State where the property is retained." Id The Court
rejected an attempt by the state to tax a domestic corporation on tangible personal property
located in other states. Id at 201, 211.
tax foreign corporations on their tangible property in the state, 169 states
could not tax corporations on any value associated with the corporation
that was not represented by tangible property, because this would repre-
sent an impermissible tax on interstate commerce. 70 The tie to power
over the person or thing being taxed was reinforced by authorities hold-
ing that a judgment for taxes was unenforceable in another state. 7'
The rule that a state could not tax a foreign corporation because it
engaged in interstate commerce within the state was evaded through the
device of valuing the physical assets of the corporation fixed within the
state, as to which the state's jurisdiction to tax was unchallenged, by ap-
portioning the overall value of a company, as reflected in its stock price,
among physical assets. 72 It eventually became clear that the limits im-
posed by the Supreme Court were linguistic, not substantive."' At that
point, the Supreme Court abolished its old requirements and established
a generalized test of fairness. Under the Supreme Court's current ap-
proach, a state tax on interstate commerce does not offend the Com-
merce Clause "when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided
169. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 649 (1888).
170. [N]o state has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether
by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on
the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of
carrying it on, and the reason is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce,
and amounts to a regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress.
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888); accord Philadelphia & Southern S.S. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 344 (1887). Similar rules applied for federal agencies and instru-
mentalities. "All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends, are objects of
taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest principles, exempt
from taxation." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819). Therefore, the
state could not tax a federal instrumentality. Id. at 428-31.
Even more restrictive rules applied for ships, which could only be taxed at their home
port. Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596, 599-600 (1855). Hays has since
been restricted to cases of oceanic navigation. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336
U.S. 169, 173-74 (1949) (allowing an apportioned tax on vessels moving in inland waters);
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952) (refusing to allow the state that incorporated the
corporation owning vessels and in which the vessels were registered to tax on an unappor-
tioned basis). Peck held that "[t]he rule which permits taxation by two or more states on an
apportionment basis precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of the domicile." Id.
at 384. The Court restricted the home port doctrine to cases of oceanic navigation. See id
171. See, eg., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 443, 610 comment c (1934). Mil-
waukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935), held that a sister state judgment
for taxes must be enforced, expressly rejecting earlier cases in lower courts to the contrary, see
id. at 274 & nn.2-3, and the position taken by the Restatement, see id at 279 n.4.
172. See Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 220 (1897).
173. See, ag., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977) (describing
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by the State." 74 Under this approach, the Court allows a tax on gross
receipts of foreign corporations so long as it is fairly apportioned between
jurisdictions.17
Two developments limit this expansion of state power to tax. First,
in expanding state power to tax, the Court has increasingly erected re-
quirements of apportionment or reasonableness. In American Trucking
Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, the Court created a major restriction on
states' power to tax beyond their borders, a requirement of consistency.
"To pass the 'internal consistency' test, a state tax must be of a kind that,
'if applied by every jurisdiction, there would be no impermissible inter-
ference with free trade.' ""76 This inconsistency is a hypothetical test.
"[T]he actual imposition of flat taxes by other jurisdictions is not neces-
sary to sustain the Commerce Clause challenge... under the 'internal
consistency' test . . .. T This requirement is recent. As Justice
O'Connor has observed, "Creating an 'internal consistency' rule of gen-
eral application is an entirely novel enterprise that the Court undertakes
for the first time in this case."'1
78
Second, the expansion of state power to tax has been predicated on
the availability of the Court to reconcile potentially inconsistent demands
for taxes. When the Court is unavailable to mandate a scheme of appor-
tionment, it has reverted to the old principles of allowing a tax on tangi-
ble property only by the state where the property is registered. This can
be seen in cases in which both the Foreign Commerce and the Domestic
Commerce Clauses are raised, such as Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles. 179 In Japan Line, California attempted to tax containers tempo-
rarily present in California that were used solely in foreign commerce,
that were owned by Japanese companies, and that had their home ports
in Japan. 180 The Court recognized that the tax might satisfy any appor-
174. Id.; see also Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep't of the
Treasury, 490 U.S. 66 (1989).
175. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
176. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 284 (1987) (quoting
Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984)).
177. Id. at 285.
178. Id. at 303 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington
Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 255-56 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The remarks of Justices
O'Connor and Scalia betray a lack of historical perspective. First, the Court mandated appor-
tionment for vessels as early as Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384 (1952), which
refused to allow the state that incorporated the corporation owning vessels and in which the
vessels were registered to tax the vessels on an unapportioned basis. Second, it is only the
Court's broadening of states' powers to tax that makes it essential that some other, albeit less
restrictive, means be used to keep state conduct within its proper sphere.
179. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
180. IM at 436.
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tionment requirement under the tests used for domestic commerce.'" 1
However, the Court rejected the argument "that the Commerce Clause
analysis is identical, regardless of whether interstate or foreign commerce
is involved,"1"2 because the Court could enforce a requirement of appor-
tionment in the United States,18 3 but could not reconcile the claims of
American and foreign jurisdictions.'8 4 Because the Court could not en-
force an apportionment scheme, it resorted to the mechanical factors of
ownership and registration of the cargo containers, by stating that the
nation where the "containers are owned, based, and registered" "has the
right to tax the containers in full."i '8
By contrast, when corporate boundaries are concerned, the Court is
willing to permit apportionment, at least when the parent corporation is
American."8 6 In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, the
Court permitted a tax on foreign subsidiaries of domestic
corporations.1
8 7
The taxing cases support our suggestion with respect to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause in a number of ways. First, the Court's holding
in Tyler Pipe overrules earlier decisions,' showing that the possibility of
inconsistency is all that is required. Our rule relies on a similar analysis
181. Id. at 445.
182. Id. at 446. This was the first recognition of the distinction between interstate and
foreign commerce.
183. "The basis for this Court's approval of apportioned property taxation, in other words,
has been its ability to enforce full apportionment by all potential taxing bodies." IkL at 447.
184. Due to the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that the ag-
gregation of taxes is computed on no more than one full value, a state tax, even
though "fairly apportioned" to reflect an instrumentality's presence within the State,
may subject foreign commerce" 'to the risk of a double tax burden to which [domes-
tic] commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids.'"
Id. at 447-48 (quoting Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 94 (1972) (quoting J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938)) (alteration by Japan Line Court)). "In interstate commerce,
if the domiciliary State is 'to blame' for exacting an excessive tax, this Court is able to insist
upon rationalization of the apportionment. As noted above, however, this Court is powerless
to correct malapportionment of taxes imposed from abroad in foreign commerce." Id. at 454.
185. Id. at 451-52. A state would not have had the right to tax on an unapportioned basis
merely because it had incorporated the corporation owning the property and was the state in
which they were registered. See Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384 (1952).
186. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 185 (1983), recognized
the continued validity of Japan Line: "Although consistent application of the fair apportion-
ment standard can generally mitigate, if not eliminate, double taxation in the domestic context,
'neither this Court nor this Nation can ensure full apportionment when one of the taxing
entities is a foreign sovereign.'" Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 185-86 (quoting Japan Line, 441
U.S. at 447). It distinguished, however, between property and income taxes. Id at 188.
187. 463 U.S. 159, 163 (1983).
188. 483 U.S. 232, 248 (1987) (expressly overruling General Motors Corp. v. Washington,
377 U.S. 436, 439 (1964)); see also id at 255 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing overruled
decisions).
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under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In both areas, such a test avoids
the need for the Supreme Court to commit itself to one particular
method, whether it is a particular rule determining which state's law gov-
erns or a particular rule apportioning taxes. The Court often has noted
its reluctance to commit itself to one method of apportionment in the tax
cases 189 and has refused to require one theory of choice of law in the
conflicts cases. 190 Furthermore, a consistency test limits de novo ad-
judication of questions of fact, something that has also concerned
the Supreme Court in both the tax cases1 91 and the full faith and credit
cases. 192
More generally, the cases dealing with power to tax, particularly
Japan Line's rejection of the use of tests based on interstate commerce in
the area of foreign commerce, demonstrate a growing awareness of the
role of the Court in apportioning taxes, which makes older precedents
drawn from the allocation of power to tax among independent nations
irrelevant. These same older precedents underlie the Court's unwilling-
ness to police states' choices in the area of conflict of laws.
Finally, the Court's reluctance in Container Corp. to attribute con-
clusive weight to corporate structures in allocating income, even in the
area of foreign subsidiaries of American corporations, may indicate the
Court's understanding of the manipulability of the corporate form. The
Court's willingness to pierce corporate structures for tax purposes sug-
gests that the Court would not attach conclusive weight to the internal
affairs doctrine in deciding what state should regulate corporations.
2. Recognition of Judgments
The cases dealing with extraterritorial recognition of judgments
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing statutes 93
adopt what we call an indirectness principle: A court cannot directly
determine the extraterritorial effect of a judgment by specifying that ef-
fect. Rather, the court can only determine the extraterritorial effect by
specifying the effect within the state.1 94 By disallowing the state to regu-
late directly the extraterritorial effects of its judgments, the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and its implementing statutes discourage attempts by
189. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 176.
190. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985).
191. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 176.
192. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 835 & n. 15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
194. "[A] State is permitted to determine the extraterritorial effect of its judgments; but it
may only do so indirectly, by prescribing the effect of its judgments within the State." Thomas
v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270 (1980) (plurality opinion).
one state to aggrandize its jurisdiction by making its judgments especially
difficult to alter.
The universality requirement is consistent with such an approach.
Under it, a legislature can give its statutes an extraterritorial effect only
by giving effect to similar statutes enacted by other states. By tying the
extraterritorial effect to the internal effect, the motivation for unnecessa-
rily exerting state power is eliminated.
For example, suppose the legislature in State X decides that it wants
most strongly to regulate corporations on the basis of the state of incor-
poration. If it passes a law regulating solely on the basis of the state of
incorporation, that law will be entitled to extraterritorial effect. Suppose,
however, that in attempting to aggrandize State X's jurisdiction to pre-
scribe, its legislature also sought to regulate those corporations that had
more assets present in State X than in any other state. Under the univer-
sality requirement, passing such a statute would mean that another
state's regulation on the basis of presence of assets would be entitled to
respect within the courts of State X. This result would frustrate the at-
tempt of State X's legislature to regulate on the basis of incorporation,
which the legislature believed to be the most important basis for regula-
tion. Therefore, a rational legislature in State X would not adopt such a
statute.
Legislation with a purported extraterritorial effect poses a problem
fundamentally different from judicial decisions. Because it involves es-
tablishing rules that are intended to apply in other states, it avoids the
check provided by the indirectness limitations imposed on state judg-
ments. Without the check on the aggrandizement of state power posed
by the rule that judgments have only the extraterritorial effect they pos-
sess inside the territory, legislatures may overreach. 195 Moreover, this
type of legislation's effect is not confined to the parties to a particular
judgment.
The Court has recognized that legislation presents issues different
from recognition of judgments. "Full faith and credit does not here en-
able one state to legislate for the other or to project its laws across state
lines so as to preclude the other from prescribing for itself the legal con-
sequences of acts within it."
196
195. In addition, some Justices have suggested that a state has a stronger interest in pro-
tecting a judgment than such a statute. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 292-93 (Rehnquist, C.J., & Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
196. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 504-05
(1939), quoted in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,423-24 (1979). In Pacific Employers, a worker
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In the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which Congress
has not prescribed, where the policy of one state statute comes into
conflict with that of another, the necessity of some accommodation
of the conflicting interests of the two states is still more
apparent....
[.. T]he conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic
effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of
each state to subordinate its own statutes to those of the other, but
by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and
turning the scale of decision according to their weight.19
This rule is akin to the governmental interest test adopted in ordinary
conflict of laws cases.1
98
While those ordinary conflict of laws cases did not adopt the conclu-
sions presented here, they are consistent with the conclusions here be-
cause the cases dealt with legislation not intended to be exclusive. 99
Under such cases, our rule shows that it causes no problem to leave the
choice to the plaintiff.
While this rule expands the limits that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause imposes on state action, this expansion parallels the broadening of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause in other areas. For example, in overrul-
ing earlier cases, the Court has held that a sister state judgment for taxes
must be enforced.2"o The Court also has enforced a judgment against a
state, although neither the enforcing state's court nor the federal court
could have handed down that very judgment.20'
3. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
Changes in the Supreme Court's approach to personal jurisdiction
are similarly consistent with our approach. Under the power theory,
states can extend the scope of jurisdiction to prescribe by defining a ficti-
and employer agreed to apply Massachusetts law, but California was the situs of the accident.
California was held able to apply its worker's compensation law.
While some have claimed that "in dealing with full faith and credit to statutes the
Supreme Court in recent years has accorded no weight to language which purported to give a
particular statute extraterritorial effect," Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit
to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153, 162 (1949), quoted in Thomas, 448 U.S. at 271 n.15
(plurality opinion), this is not an invariable rule. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286
U.S. 145, 153 (1932).
197. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
198. The Court in Thomas, 448 U.S. at 279-80 (plurality opinion), also used a conflictual
approach, comparing the strengths of state interests in foreclosing a second worker's compen-
sation proceeding.
199. When a statute purports to have an extraterritorial effect, the statute's effect cannot be
reduced by interpretation. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971).
200. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
201. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
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tious situs that would grant them power over the status or property. For
example, a state could argue that the stock or bonds of a corporation
incorporated in the state were present in the state for purposes of the
power theory. Outside the corporate area, a state could claim that the
domicile of one party to a marriage in that state gave the state jurisdic-
tion to resolve issues arising out of that marriage.
The Court has limited such attempts. In Shaffer v. Heitner,202 Dela-
ware asserted jurisdiction to adjudicate by seizing stock, as authorized by
its rule that the situs of ownership of stock is the state of incorporation.
The rule was enforced by the posting of stop-transfer orders on the books
of the corporation.20 3 Such a rule could be justified under the power
theory by noting that the power to transfer the stock or to receive divi-
dends and other benefits of shareholdership could only be enforced in
Delaware, the domicile of the corporation.2t 4 The Court, however, re-
jected Delaware's rule. Similarly, the Court rejected Wisconsin's much
less unusual rule that a wife's domicile is that of her husband when the
husband seeks custody of the children in a divorce and the wife and chil-
dren live in another state.20 5 Finally, the Court allowed a state in which
one party to a marriage was domiciled to grant a divorce,20 6 but not to
202. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
203. Id. at 192.
204. This result would be entirely consistent with such cases as Blackstone v. Miller, 188
U.S. 189, 205 (1903), which held that the situs of the debt was the debtor. The Court allowed
the state of the situs to tax the debt transfer. But cf Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania (The Case of
the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds), 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300, 320 (1872) (a state of incorpo-
ration may not tax bonds issued by the corporation owned by non-residents and held out-of-
state). Justice Holmes distinguished this case in his Blackstone opinion by stating, "The taxa-
tion in that case was on the interest on bonds held out of the State. Bonds and negotiable
instruments are more than merely evidences of debt. The debt is inseparable from the paper
which declares and constitutes it, by a tradition which comes down from more archaic condi-
tions." Blackstone, 188 U.S. at 206. Justice Holmes cited his decision in Bacon v. Hooker, 177
Mass. 335, 337-38, 58 N.E. 1078, 1079 (1901), which discussed older cases holding that the
existence of a sealed contract or executory deed depended on the existence of the documentary
memorialization of the agreement or the deed. He continued in Blackstone, "Therefore, con-
sidering only the place of the property, it was held that bonds held out of the State could not be
reached. The decision has been cut down to its precise point by later cases." Blackstone, 188
U.S. at 206. In one of these later cases, Savings & Loan Soc'y v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S.
421, 428 (1898), the Court held that a state could tax the mortgagee of property, although the
mortgagee was domiciled in another state. The Savings & Loan Society Court explained that
the conclusion in State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds resulted from the Pennsylvania court's
determination that the holder of the bonds had no property interest in Pennsylvania. Id. In
New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309, 320 (1899), the Court permitted states flexibility in
characterizing the situs of property when the property was not in the owner's physical
possession.
205. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953).
206. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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resolve property issues or alimony in connection with the divorce.20 7
These cases do not expressly reject the power theory. However, lim-
iting a state's power to characterize persons, property, or relationships as
present within the state for the purposes of jurisdiction to adjudicate sug-
gests that the Court would accept similar limits on a state's power for
jurisdiction to prescribe. Particularly in Shaffer, the Court's result is in-
consistent with past cases applying the power theory.
More generally, tests basing jurisdiction to adjudicate on power and
territory, like Pennoyer v. Neff,20 have long been abolished in favor of
tests based on convenience.2"9 The more recent cases hold that the reli-
ance of Pennoyer on "territorial power.., has been undermined."210 The
Supreme Court has held that the situs of property is no longer a sufficient
basis for in rem jurisdiction.2" The rejection of the power theory and
the Court's reliance on convenience in the area of jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate these cases suggest that the Court is prepared to adopt similar prin-
ciples in the area of jurisdiction to prescribe.
4. The Rejection of the Law of the Situs in Federal Common Law Cases
The power theory emphasized the role of the presence of property to
determine which jurisdiction could prescribe. In some federal common
law cases, the Supreme Court has rejected the test of presence for deter-
mining which law governs. This rejection emphasizes the Court's will-
ingness to look to new principles to determine jurisdiction to prescribe.
The transition from older rules that relied on presence is notable in
admiralty law. As the Supreme Court has observed, "The admiralty ju-
risdiction in tort was traditionally 'bounded by locality,' encompassing
all torts that took place on navigable waters."2 2 More recently, how-
ever, the Supreme Court rejected a locality test to determine what torts
are within the admiralty jurisdiction. In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
207. "[A] court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant." Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957); see also
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948) (allowing the state of matrimonial domicile to deter-
mine alimony although another state could grant the divorce).
208. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
209. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See generally von Meh-
ren & Trautman, supra note 17.
210. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197, 211 (1977).
211. Id., overruling Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), noted in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980).
212. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 215 n.7 (1969) (citations omitted)
(quoting De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776) (Story, J.)). As
the Court there noted, Justice Story's opinion as Circuit Judge had been followed in Insurance
Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 35 (1870).
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City of Cleveland,213 the Court held that the landing of a plane in naviga-
ble waters did not make the resulting lawsuits subject to admiralty juris-
diction, regardless of whether the accident was caused by negligence over
the water or on the ground.21 The Supreme Court has reatfirmed that
holding, although deciding by a five-four vote that a collision between
pleasure boats was within admiralty jurisdiction.215 Similar transitions
have occurred widely in state common law.216
HI. Conclusion
Corporations frequently have significant contacts with more than
one jurisdiction. A corporation may be incorporated in one state, have
its headquarters in another, the majority of its assets and employees in a
third, and the majority of its shareholders in a fourth. Each of these
states has a reasonable claim to the right to regulate the corporation.
Conflicting state regulations create uncertainties for one attempting to
comply with the relevant laws and raise some serious questions regarding
state power to regulate in this area.
This Article has proposed a method for regulating those conflicts.
Under our proposed approach, attempts to regulate transactions must
meet a universality requirement, which provides that only those laws
which could be applied by all states without a conflict would be valid.
This approach is a reasonable extension of past precedent to solve
the novel problem of conflicting regulations of corporate transactions.
Adopting the universality requirement will be beneficial in several re-
spects. First, it will invalidate immediately some state assertions ofjuris-
diction to prescribe. This will eliminate the in terrorem effect of many
state laws and end a number of potential conflicts.
Second, by identifying which assertions of jurisdiction to prescribe
are overbroad, the universality requirement will encourage legislatures to
set priorities. We expect that the process of setting priorities will elimi-
nate many of these conflicts. In practice, the owners of shares are too
diffuse in the case of corporations with distributed operations for share
ownership by itself to be a likely way for legislatures to choose to govern
corporations. In addition, mere presence of facilities will not satisfy the
universality requirement. Consequently, states are likely to choose to
213. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
214. Id. at 267.
215. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
216. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 477-89, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281-82, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 746-47 (1963) (discussing increasing reluctance to apply the law of the place of
the tort).
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regulate on the basis of the principal place of business or the state of
incorporation. This will substantially reduce the number of conflicts.
An important advantage of the universality requirement is that it
couples the procedure for legislation with a mechanism that deters at-
tempts at aggrandizement of state power. The most problematic areas of
jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate have been those in
which there is no effective political check on state assertions of jurisdic-
tion. In the area of jurisdiction to adjudicate, the tendency of states to
expand jurisdiction against non-residents to the limits allowed by the
Constitution can be explained in part because this expansion merely dis-
advantages non-residents, who have no voting power. By contrast,
abuses of states' jurisdiction to adjudicate against absent domiciliaries do
not seem to have caused difficulties. Domiciliaries are entitled to vote,
and their votes therefore present a check on arbitrariness against them.
Similarly, the area of finality of judgments has caused relatively few
problems, perhaps because the finality of a court's judgment out of the
state is the same as the finality of its judgment in the state.
In the area of jurisdiction to prescribe, there has hitherto been no
reason for a state to refrain from attempting to govern as many cases as
possible by the values expressed in its laws.217 Consequently, states have
tended to expand, either judicially or legislatively, the number of cases
that their laws govern. The expansions in power to adjudicate and to
prescribe have reinforced one another: Because a state retains great flexi-
bility to apply its own laws, the desire to have its substantive law govern
encourages an assertion of jurisdiction to adjudicate.
A third advantage of the universality requirement is that it avoids
any reference to territory. As an immediate advantage, this allows atten-
tion to be paid to the achievement of shared objectives of the states and
parties.21 In addition, by turning away from territory, the universality
requirement suggests an approach to problems in the area of choice of
217. This expansion need not be the result of a mere desire to exert power. If judges tend
to believe that the laws they administer are good, and one writer has defined the very existence
of a system of laws as dependent on the existence of this belief, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 112-13 (1961), they will tend to want to apply those laws in preference to the laws of
other jurisdictions.
218. By contrast, much of the work in the area of conflict of laws still depends on rules
developed for handling international conflicts for which there is no coordinating jurisdiction.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10 (1971); id. comment d (listing
differences between conflicts involving international elements and those involving only juris-
dictions within the United States; none of these deal with the availability of a coordinating
entity in the United States). But cf von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate
Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88
HARv. L. REv. 347, 349 (1974) (discussing choice of law among different communities).
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law that are non-territorial, such as the relation of federal and state law,
which have often been excluded from concern.219
Our proposal has special implications for the regulation of corporate
takeovers. First, it should reduce the number of conflicting claims of
jurisdiction to prescribe and simplify the nature of the conflicts involved.
This will make corporate takeovers easier. Second, the universality re-
quirement, by allowing states to regulate on that basis of principal place
of business if they so choose, may reduce the ability of corporations to
incorporate in states attractive solely for their corporate law. This may
be thought to be an undesirable characteristic of the rule we propose,
because it promotes the balkanization of corporations law. However, the
balkanization of corporations law has already beem accomplished by the
proliferation of statutes asserting jurisdiction on multiple grounds. The
universality principle only minimizes the attendant difficulties. If it ulti-
mately is concluded that there is a need for a nationally available corpo-
rations law, Congress can adopt one. Such a result is preferable to
extending the Full Faith and Credit Clause to require other states to de-
fer to legislation adopted by a state with little connection to either a cor-
poration or its shareholders beyond the selection of its law.
219. A conflict between possibly applicable laws may arise in three cases: first, when
it is a question whether the laws of one or of another state apply to a given legal
situation; second, when it is a question whether earlier or later laws of the same state
apply; third, in a federated nation, when it is a question whether the laws of the
federation or of a member apply. The subject of Conflict of Laws is confined to
questions of the first class.
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § I comment c (1934). The primary difference be-
tween the first and second Restatements is that the Second Restatement is more explicit about
what it excludes. It also describes the problems in terms of "territorial states having separate
and differing systems of law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
See also id. § 2 comment c (excluding from the scope of the Restatement federal-state conflicts,
intrastate conflicts, conflicts of personal (non-territorial) law, conflicts in time, and criminal
law). An exploration of the implications of these thoughts awaits another paper.
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